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A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analyzing Legitimate Tying Cases


David S. Evans


University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

Jorge Padilla


Compass Lexecon

Michael A. Salinger


Boston University - School of Management

August 2003

EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2003: WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION?, Hart Publishing, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
There is a wide and growing consensus among antitrust scholars and practitioners in favor of a rule-of-reason approach to the assessment of tying by dominant firms. However, a rule-of-reason analysis may or may not produce socially optimal outcomes depending on how it is conducted in practice. A rule-of-reason test that places the same weight on factual evidence as on theoretical speculation is bound to cause as much harm as a rule that considers tying per se illegal: many socially beneficial ties will be found illegal. This paper discusses how to best implement a rule-of-reason approach. We consider two alternatives, a simple balancing test and a structured test, and conclude in favor of the structured test, as it is less likely to lead to costly mistakes.

Note: This work was prepared for the Eighth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, June 6-7, 2003, EUI Florence.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L41

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: November 15, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S., Padilla, Jorge Jorge and Salinger, Michael A., A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analyzing Legitimate Tying Cases (August 2003). EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2003: WHAT IS AN ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION?, Hart Publishing, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=436608 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.436608

Contact Information

David S. Evans (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
Atilano Jorge Padilla Blanco
Compass Lexecon ( email )
Paseo de Recoletos 7-9
Madrid, 28004
Spain
Michael A. Salinger
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-4408 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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