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Nullificatory Juries

David A. Hoffman
Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law

Kaimipono Wenger
Thomas Jefferson School of Law


August 17, 2003

TJSL Public Law Research Paper

Abstract:     
In this Article, we argue that current debates on the legitimacy of punitive damages would benefit from a comparison with jury nullification in criminal trials. We discuss critiques of punitive damages and of jury nullification, noting the surprising similarities in the arguments scholars use to attack these (superficially) distinct outcomes of the jury guarantee. Not only are the criticisms alike, the institutions of punitive damages and jury nullification also turn out to have many similarities: both are, we suggest, examples of what we call "nullificatory juries."

We discuss the features of such juries, and consider recent behavioral data relating to the common sense moral intuitions that appear to motivate nullificatory juries to reject utilitarianism. After considering these root causes, we provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the benefits these juries provide to society. We conclude with some modest suggestions for future avenues of research.

Keywords: behavioral, law and economics, jury behavior, jury nullification, criminal law, punitive damages, paternalism, rule of law

JEL Classifications: K10, K13, K41

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 25, 2003 ; Last revised: April 07, 2008

Suggested Citation

Hoffman, David A. and Wenger, Kaimipono, Nullificatory Juries (August 17, 2003). TJSL Public Law Research Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=436643 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.436643


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Contact Information

David A. Hoffman (Contact Author)
Temple University - James E. Beasley School of Law ( email )
1719 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-0612 (Phone)
Kaimipono Wenger
Thomas Jefferson School of Law ( email )
2121 San Diego Avenue
San Diego, CA 92110
United States
619-297-9700 (Phone)
619-296-4284 (Fax)
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