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Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second VersionGeorge J. MailathUniversity of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Andrew PostlewaiteUniversity of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics Larry SamuelsonYale University August 15, 2003 PIER Working Paper No. 03-021 Abstract: We examine contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best E response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect E-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect E-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17 Keywords: Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium JEL Classification: C70, C72, C73 working papers seriesDate posted: August 19, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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