Citations (7)


Footnotes (47)



Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors

Robert Pozen

Harvard Business School; Brookings Institution

August 2003

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 429

This paper applies the cost-benefit framework for shareholder activism, utilized by most institutional investors, to the five alternative approaches to shareholder participation in director elections suggested by the ABA Task Force on this subject. I show that none of them would likely generate benefits exceeding its costs, although there are worthwhile components of several alternatives suggested by the ABA. I argue that some of the problems involved in the alternatives under considerations could be avoided by allowing institutional investors to cumulate their votes for one director nominee. However, cumulative voting is not permitted by most company charters, which may be changed only if the company's directors put forward a charter amendment for a vote by its shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: D70, G30, G32, G34, G38, K22

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 20, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Pozen, Robert, Institutional Perspective on Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors (August 2003). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 429. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=437160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.437160

Contact Information

Robert Pozen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,355
Downloads: 523
Download Rank: 34,143
Citations:  7
Footnotes:  47

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.578 seconds