Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
University of Cambridge - Centre for Business Research (CBR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law
Suzanne J. Konzelmann
University of London - Birkbeck College - Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Management and Organizational Psychology; University of Cambridge - Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 41, pp. 531-555, September 2003
Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors' duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks largely to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 25Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 4, 2003
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