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Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Strategy Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest

Virtudes Alba-Fernandez
University of Jaén - Department of Statistics

Pablo Branas-Garza
University of Granada - Departamento de Teoria e Historia Económica

Francisca Jimenez-Jimenez
University of Jaén - Department of Economics; University of Valencia - Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX)

Javier Rodero Cosano
University of Valencia - Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX)




Abstract:     
The aim of this investigation is to display how the use of classroom experiments may be a good pedagogical tool to teach the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. The basic game for our purposes is a repeated version of the Beauty Contest Game (BCG), a simple guessing game whose repetition lets students react to other players' choices and to converge iteratively to the equilibrium solution. We performed this experiment to undergraduated students without any previous knowledge about game theory. After four rounds, we observed in all groups a clear decreasing tendency in the average chosen number. So, our findings prove that, playing a repeated BCG, students learn quickly how to reach the NE solution.

JEL Classifications: A22, C99, D83

Case and Teaching Paper Series

Date posted: October 10, 2003 ; Last revised: October 10, 2003

Suggested Citation

Alba-Fernandez, Virtudes, Branas-Garza, Pablo, Jimenez-Jimenez, Francisca and Rodero Cosano, Javier, Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Strategy Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=437561


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Contact Information

Virtudes Alba-Fernandez (Contact Author)
University of Jaén - Department of Statistics ( email )
23071 Jaen Spain
34 953 01 21 42 (Phone)
34 953 01 20 34 (Fax)
Pablo Branas-Garza
University of Granada - Departamento de Teoria e Historia Económica ( email )
E-18071 Granada Spain
0034958246192 (Phone)
0034958244046 (Fax)
Francisca Jimenez-Jimenez
University of Jaén - Department of Economics ( email )
23071 Jaen Spain
34 953 01 20 74 (Phone)
University of Valencia - Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX)
46022 Valencia Spain
Javier Rodero Cosano
University of Valencia - Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics (LINEEX)
46022 Valencia Spain
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