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'Whistle Blowing' Regulation and Accounting Standards En-forcement in Germany and Europe - An Economic Perspective

Matthias Schmidt
Humboldt University Berlin


August 2003

Humboldt University Business and Economics Discussion Paper No. 29

Abstract:     
Many countries regard whistle blowing by employees as eligible to assure ethical conduct of firms and therefore enacted statutory rules in order to fortify that behavior, the US most notably with two provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. The article takes a neo-institutional economics perspective on the phenomenon of whistle blowing and analyzes in what sense a statutory fortification is indeed legitimate. Differently sophisticated regulatory models in the US, the UK and in Germany are discussed, and a statutory approach is suggested that seems appropriate to utilize whistle blowing particularly to enhance the regulation of accounting standards enforcement in Germany and Europe.

Keywords: accounting rule enforcement, institutional legitimacy, whistle blowing regulation

JEL Classifications: G38, K22, K42, L51, M41, M44

Working Paper Series

Date posted: September 08, 2003 ; Last revised: September 16, 2003

Suggested Citation

Schmidt, Matthias, 'Whistle Blowing' Regulation and Accounting Standards En-forcement in Germany and Europe - An Economic Perspective (August 2003). Humboldt University Business and Economics Discussion Paper No. 29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=438480 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.438480


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Matthias Schmidt (Contact Author)
Humboldt University Berlin ( email )
Spandauer Str. 1
Institute for Accounting & Auditing
D-10178 Berlin Germany
+49 30 2093 5782 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5670 (Fax)
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