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Matching and Price Competition


Jeremy Bulow


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan Levin


Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
July 2003

Stanford University Research Paper No. 1818

Abstract:     
We develop a model in which firms set their salary levels before matching with workers. Wages fall relative to any competitive equilibrium while profits rise almost as much, implying little inefficiency. Furthermore, the best firms gain the most from the system while wages become compressed. We explore the performance of alternative institutions and discuss the recent antitrust case against the National Residency Matching Program in light of our results.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

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Date posted: October 6, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Bulow, Jeremy and Levin, Jonathan D., Matching and Price Competition (July 2003). Stanford University Research Paper No. 1818. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=441006 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.441006

Contact Information

Jeremy I. Bulow (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Room L 237
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-2160 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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