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Advance Directives and Medical Treatment at the End of Life


Daniel P. Kessler


Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mark B. McClellan


Brookings Institution; Council of Economic Advisors; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Stanford Graduate School of Business

September 2003

NBER Working Paper No. w9955

Abstract:     
To assess the consequences of advance medical directives -- which explicitly specify a patient's preferences for one or more specific types of medical treatment in the event of a loss of competence we analyze the medical care of elderly Medicare beneficiaries who died between 1985-1995. We compare the care of patients from states that adopted laws enhancing incentives for compliance with advance directives and laws requiring the appointment of a health care surrogate in the absence of an advance directive to the care of patients from states that did not. We report three key findings. First, laws enhancing incentives for compliance significantly reduce the probability of dying in an acute care hospital. Second, laws requiring the appointment of a surrogate significantly increase the probability of receiving acute care in the last month of life, but decrease the probability of receiving nonacute care. Third, neither type of law leads to any savings in medical expenditures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

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Date posted: September 11, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Kessler, Daniel P. and McClellan, Mark B., Advance Directives and Medical Treatment at the End of Life (September 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9955. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=441588

Contact Information

Daniel Philip Kessler (Contact Author)
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-4492 (Phone)
650-725-6152 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Mark B. McClellan
Brookings Institution ( email )
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Council of Economic Advisors ( email )
Eisenhower Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20502
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
Landau Economics Building
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
650-723-3982 (Phone)
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