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Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs


Todd R. Kaplan


University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics; University of Haifa - Department of Economics

Aner Sela


Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
September 20, 2006


Abstract:     
We study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: Symmetric auctions, Asymmetric auctions, Entry costs

JEL Classification: D44, O31, O32

working papers series


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Date posted: October 11, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Kaplan, Todd R. and Sela, Aner, Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs (September 20, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=442521 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.442521

Contact Information

Todd R. Kaplan (Contact Author)
University of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
Streatham Court
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
United Kingdom
+44 13 9226 3237 (Phone)
University of Haifa - Department of Economics
Haifa 31905
Israel
Aner Sela
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )
Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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