|
||||
|
||||
Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions
Stuart Gillan Texas Tech University - Area of Finance Jay C. Hartzell University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance Laura T. Starks University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance August 21, 2003 Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Working Paper No. 2003-03 Abstract: We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose the mechanisms that comprise those structures. In particular, an industry's investment opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive environment, information environment, and leverage help explain its corporate governance. Examining groups of similar corporate governance mechanisms shows that firm and industry factors can have quite different associations (in strength and direction) with the monitoring capabilities of the board of directors versus the shareholder orientation of corporate charter provisions. Although industry factors play a dominant role in explaining an index of total governance, we find that firm and industry factors contribute almost equally in explaining the variation of sub-indices capturing aspects of board structure and charter provision use.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Endogeneity, Board of Directors, Charter Provisions JEL Classifications: G30, G34 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: October 14, 2003 ; Last revised: October 14, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
© 2010 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
FAQ
Terms of Use
Privacy Policy
Copyright
This page was served by apolloa 4 in 0.329 seconds.