Abstract

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Unbundling Institutions


Daron Acemoglu


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Simon Johnson


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

July 2003

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 03-29; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings

Abstract:     
This paper evaluates the importance of "property rights institutions," which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and "contracting institutions," which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history, and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization), and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variables approach, we find that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often find ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse effects of contracting institutions, but are unable to do so against the risk of expropriation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: Contracts, Economic Growth, Financial Development, Institutions, Law and Finance, Legal Formalism, Legal Origin, Political Economy, Politics, Property Rights

JEL Classification: E44, G18, K00, N20, P16, P17

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Date posted: December 28, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon, Unbundling Institutions (July 2003). MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 03-29; AFA 2005 Philadelphia Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=442900 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.442900

Contact Information

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-380b
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-1927 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Simon Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Entrepreneurship Center ( email )
United States
617-253-8412 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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