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Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem

Mark A. Lemley
Stanford Law School



Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, p. 1041, 1996

Abstract:     
This article evaluates the economics of the Internet and Internet-related software markets, which are heavily driven towards standardization. It suggests that a traditional section 2 antitrust analysis will fail to effectively regulate competition in such a market, particularly if it is directed at structural relief. Instead, the article recommends that section 2 play a limited role in regulating conduct in a standards competition. The article also suggests that private standard-setting may play a procompetitive role in the Internet context, and that section 1 should be relaxed in order to permit such joint activity (within certain limits).

Note: Published in the Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, P. 1041, 1996.

JEL Classifications: K21, L86

Working Paper Series

Date posted: December 10, 1996 ; Last revised: May 03, 2007

Suggested Citation

Lemley, Mark A., Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem. Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, p. 1041, 1996. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=44458 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.44458


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Contact Information

Mark A. Lemley (Contact Author)
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
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