Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem
Mark A. Lemley
Stanford Law School
Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, p. 1041, 1996
This article evaluates the economics of the Internet and Internet-related software markets, which are heavily driven towards standardization. It suggests that a traditional section 2 antitrust analysis will fail to effectively regulate competition in such a market, particularly if it is directed at structural relief. Instead, the article recommends that section 2 play a limited role in regulating conduct in a standards competition. The article also suggests that private standard-setting may play a procompetitive role in the Internet context, and that section 1 should be relaxed in order to permit such joint activity (within certain limits).
Note: Published in the Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 28, P. 1041, 1996.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63
JEL Classification: K21, L86working papers series
Date posted: December 10, 1996
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.360 seconds