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Politically Connected Firms

Mara Faccio
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


July 13, 2004


Abstract:     
Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.

JEL Classifications: G3, F30

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 15, 2003 ; Last revised: July 14, 2004

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara, Politically Connected Firms (July 13, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=444960 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.444960


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Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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References: 34
Citations: 87

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