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Citations (213)



Politically Connected Firms

Mara Faccio

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

July 13, 2004

Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

JEL Classification: G3, F30

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Date posted: October 15, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Faccio, Mara, Politically Connected Firms (July 13, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=444960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.444960

Contact Information

Mara Faccio (Contact Author)
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
B-1050 Brussels
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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References:  34
Citations:  213

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