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Why Do Governments Privatize Abroad?

Bernardo Bortolotti
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM); Università di Torino

Marcella Fantini
National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA)

Carlo Scarpa
University of Brescia



International Review of Finance, Vol. 3, pp. 131-161, June 2002

Abstract:     
Privatization through global equity market placement has largely contributed to financial market development and integration. Despite the relevance of the fact, the reasons underlying governments' choice to sell shares of privatized companies abroad are still poorly understood. This paper presents new evidence for a sample of 233 share issue privatizations in 20 OECD countries, showing that redistribution concerns and the objective of domestic financial market development make domestic privatization more likely. However, if budget constraints are binding, governments tend to sell abroad a larger quantity of shares, particularly when corporate governance at home is weak.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: October 19, 2003 ; Last revised: February 29, 2004

Suggested Citation

Bortolotti, Bernardo, Fantini, Marcella and Scarpa, Carlo, Why Do Governments Privatize Abroad?. International Review of Finance, Vol. 3, pp. 131-161, June 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=447350


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Contact Information

Bernardo Bortolotti (Contact Author)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) ( email )
C.so Magenta 63
20123 Milano Italy
+39 02 52036931 (Phone)
+39 02 52036946 (Fax)
Università di Torino ( email )
Corso Unione Sovietica, 218 bis
10134 Torino 13820-4020
Italy
+39 02 52036931 (Phone)
+39 02 52036946 (Fax)
Marcella Fantini
National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) ( email )
Rome Italy
Carlo Scarpa
University of Brescia ( email )
Via San Faustino 74B
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche
25122 Brescia Italy
+39+030+2988+833 (Phone)
+39+030+2988+839/840 (Fax)
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