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File name: SSRN-id452220. ; Size: 447K
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Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age
Joseph Farrell
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Phil Weiser
University of Colorado Law School
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17, No. 1, Fall 2003
Abstract:
Antitrust law and telecommunications regulation have long adopted different stances on whether to mandate open access to information platforms. This article aims to help regulators and commentators incorporate both Chicago School and post-Chicago School arguments in evaluating this basic policy choice, suggesting how they can be integrated in an effective manner. In particular, the authors outline three alternative models that the FCC could adopt to guide its regulation of information platforms and facilitate a true convergence between antitrust and regulatory policy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
JEL Classification: L0, L1, L4, L5, O3
Accepted Paper Series
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Date posted: October 20, 2003
Suggested CitationFarrell, Joseph and Weiser, Phil, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 17, No. 1, Fall 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=452220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452220
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