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Foreign Owners and Plant Survival


Andrew B. Bernard


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fredrik Sjoholm


Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

October 2003

Tuck Business School Working Paper No. 03-30

Abstract:     
In recent years, international capital flows of all types have increased dramatically and most governments have been actively encouraging inflows of direct investment. However, concerns remain that reliance on foreign multinationals may be a risky development strategy as foreign firms are likely to be less rooted in the local economy and may be quicker to close down production. This paper asks whether foreign owners are more likely to close plants than domestic owners. In Indonesia, plants with any foreign ownership are far less likely to close than wholly-owned domestic plants. However, the lower probability of shutdown is a result of the larger size of foreign plants rather than their nationality of ownership. Controlling for plant size and productivity, we find that foreign plants are significantly more likely to close than comparable domestic establishments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: multinational, shutdown, exit, closure, public ownership

JEL Classification: F23, L25

working papers series


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Date posted: October 24, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Bernard, Andrew B. and Sjoholm, Fredrik, Foreign Owners and Plant Survival (October 2003). Tuck Business School Working Paper No. 03-30. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=455280 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.455280

Contact Information

Andrew B. Bernard (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
100 Tuck Hall
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-0302 (Phone)
603-646-9084 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/Andrew.Bernard/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Fredrik Sjoholm
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 6501
Sveavagen 65
S-113 83 Stockholm
Sweden
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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