Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=457500
 
 

Citations (3)



 
 

Footnotes (126)



 


 



Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order


Nita Ghei


Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, March 2004
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-42

Abstract:     
In a world with multiple, overlapping jurisdictions, any given litigation could be pursued in more than one forum. Different laws can yield different outcomes. This leads to parties selecting a forum perceived as favorable to file suit. This practice, also known as forum shopping, has been much criticized, and various reforms to the law of conflicts of law have been proposed as a way to reduce this practice. The article examines the inefficiencies associated with forum selection, and the alleged shortcomings in conflicts law as it currently exists. We argue that forum selection cannot be eliminated in a world with multiple jurisdictions. Further, we argue that conflicts law has evolved, and continues to evolve, so that it tends toward correcting inefficiencies associated with the system. We draw an analogy between the system of conflicts of law and a market, where, despite the fact that the actors lack perfect information, the outcome is largely efficient. Therefore, conflicts of law might be considered to be an example of spontaneous order.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: October 22, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Ghei, Nita and Parisi, Francesco, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping: Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order. Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, March 2004; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-42. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=457500 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.457500

Contact Information

Nita Ghei
Mercatus Center at George Mason University ( email )
3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.mercatus.org
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,636
Downloads: 317
Download Rank: 55,660
Citations:  3
Footnotes:  126

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.281 seconds