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The Economics of Tort Law: A PrecisGiuseppe Dari-MattiacciUniversity of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute Francesco ParisiUniversity of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna THE ELGAR COMPANION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2nd ed.), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006 George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-49 Abstract: Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 16, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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