Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=4596
 
 

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Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top


F. H. Buckley


George Mason University School of Law

Margaret F. Brinig


Notre Dame Law School

June 28, 1996


Abstract:     
Race to the bottom explanations of welfare policies suggest that the power to set welfare payouts should be assigned to the federal government. Such theories predict that states cut benefits levels when faced with an increased demand for welfare from welfare migrants. This Article's econometric study of the determinants of AFDC payouts finds no evidence that states react in this way. This suggests that states should be accorded the power to curtail welfare payments to new arrivals through residency requirements, an issue left as moot in Anderson v. Green.

JEL Classification: I38, J61, H53, H72

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 28, 1997  

Suggested Citation

Buckley, F. H. and Brinig, Margaret F., Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top (June 28, 1996). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=4596

Contact Information

Francis (Frank) H. Buckley (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-8028 (Phone)
703-993-8088 (Fax)
Margaret Friedlander Brinig
Notre Dame Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 780
3157 Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
United States
574-631-2303 (Phone)
574-631=8078 (Fax)
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