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Fact-Free Learning


Enriqueta Aragones


Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis

Itzhak Gilboa


Yale University - Cowles Foundation; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics

Andrew Postlewaite


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

David Schmeidler


Tel Aviv University

October 2004

PIER Working Paper No. 03-023; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1491

Abstract:     
People may be surprised by noticing certain regularities that hold in existing knowledge they have had for some time. That is, they may learn without getting new factual information. We argue that this can be partly explained by computational complexity. We show that, given a database, finding a small set of variables that obtain a certain value of R^2 is computationally hard, in the sense that this term is used in computer science. We discuss some of the implications of this result and of fact-free learning in general.

Note: An updated version of this abstract can be found at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=643545

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Computational complexity, Linear regression, Rule-based reasoning

JEL Classification: C8, D8

working papers series


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Date posted: November 24, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Aragones, Enriqueta, Gilboa, Itzhak, Postlewaite, Andrew and Schmeidler, David, Fact-Free Learning (October 2004). PIER Working Paper No. 03-023; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1491. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=460203

Contact Information

Enriqueta Aragonés
Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) - Insitute for Economic Analysis ( email )
08193 Bellaterra
Spain
34-93-580-6612 (Phone)
34-93-580-1452 (Fax)
Itzhak Gilboa (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )
Box 208281
30 Hh, Rm 14
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States
203-432-3699 (Phone)
203-432-6167 (Fax)
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-6423 (Phone)
972-3-640-9908 (Fax)
Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7350 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~apostlew
David Schmeidler
Tel Aviv University ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972-3-640-9643 (Phone)
+972-3-640-9357 (Fax)
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References:  24
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