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Ambiguity and Social InteractionJürgen EichbergerUniversity of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics David KelseyUniversity of Exeter Business School - Department of Economics Burkhard C. SchipperUniversity of California, Davis - Department of Economics March 30, 2007 Abstract: We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 34 Keywords: Ambiguity, Optimism, Pessimism, Oligopoly, Strategic Delegation, Peace-making, Choquet expected utility JEL Classification: C72, D43, D62, D81 working papers seriesDate posted: December 1, 2003Suggested CitationContact Information
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