Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=467343
 
 

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Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock's Paradox


Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci


University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE); Tinbergen Institute

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna


Public Choice, Vol. 124, Nos. 3-4, pp. 411-422, September 2005
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-53

Abstract:     
In this paper we revisit Tullock's (1980) paradox and consider a rent-seeking game in which parties face increasing returns to effort. We allow parties to randomize their strategies and give them an exit option. Given the mixed participation strategies of the parties, valuable rents may occasionally remain unexploited. We consider such a lost-treasure effect as an additional cost of rent-seeking and examine how the expected value of such a lost rent varies with changes in the parameters of the problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: rent-seeking, rent dissipation, Tullock's paradox

JEL Classification: C72, D72

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Date posted: November 12, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Parisi, Francesco, Rents, Dissipation, and Lost Treasures: Rethinking Tullock's Paradox. Public Choice, Vol. 124, Nos. 3-4, pp. 411-422, September 2005; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 03-53. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=467343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467343

Contact Information

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics (ACLE) ( email )
Roeterstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://darimattiacci.acle.nl
Tinbergen Institute
Roetersstraat 31
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=AuUfjxUAAAAJ&hl=en
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
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