Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=467349
 
 

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Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the U.S. Cellular Industry


Tomaso Duso


German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)


Public Choice, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In this paper we empirically test the simultaneity between the effects and the determinants of price regulation in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find that the regulatory regime is endogenous to firms pricing strategies. Because of lobbying successfulness, firms avoided regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective. Therefore, regulation did not significantly reduce cellular tariffs in regulated markets but it would have decreased them if adopted in non-regulated ones. Also, we provide evidence that the choice of the regulatory regime strongly depends on the political as well as regulatory environments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Endogenous Price Regulation, Lobbying Activities, Political Economy, Endogenous Switching Regression, Mobile Telecommunications, U.S.

JEL Classification: L5, D78, C35, L96

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Date posted: November 12, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Duso, Tomaso, Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: Evidence from the U.S. Cellular Industry. Public Choice, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=467349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.467349

Contact Information

Tomaso Duso (Contact Author)
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )
Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )
Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany
+49 211- 81 10235 (Phone)
+49 211- 81 15499 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/tomasoduso/home
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