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Capital Controls, Collection Costs, and Domestic Public Debt


Joshua Aizenman


University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Pablo E. Guidotti


affiliation not provided to SSRN

September 1990

NBER Working Paper No. w3443

Abstract:     
The implications of a large public debt for the implementation of capital controls for an economy where tax revenue collection is costly are examined. Conditions are analyzed under which policymakers will resort to capital controls to reduce the cost of recycling domestic public debt. The linkages between a costly tax collection mechanism, capital controls, am domestic government debt are explored in terms of a two-period m:x1el of optimal taxation. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate haw capital controls are linked to different domestic public debt levels am to different degrees of efficiency in tax-revenue collection.

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Date posted: December 29, 2006  

Suggested Citation

Aizenman, Joshua and Guidotti, Pablo E., Capital Controls, Collection Costs, and Domestic Public Debt (September 1990). NBER Working Paper No. w3443. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=471482

Contact Information

Joshua Aizenman (Contact Author)
University of California, Santa Cruz - Department of Economics ( email )
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States
831-459-4791 (Phone)
831-459-5900 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Pablo E. Guidotti
affiliation not provided to SSRN
No Address Available
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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