Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=471883
 
 

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Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Steven Shavell


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1990

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 284-312, 1991
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 78

Abstract:     
According to the contract law principle established in the famous nineteenth century English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, and followed ever since in the common law world, liability for a breach of contract is limited to losses "arising...according to the usual course of things," or that may be reasonably supposed "to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract...." Using a formal model, we attempt in this paper to analyze systematically the effects and the efficiency of this limitation on contract damages. We study two alternative rules: the limited liability rule of Hadley, and an unlimited liability rule. Our analysis focuses on the effects of the alternative rules on two types of decisions: buyers' decisions about communicating their valuations of performance to sellers; and sellers' decisions about their level of precautions to reduce the likelihood of nonperformance. We identify the efficient behavior of buyers and sellers. We then compare this efficient behavior with the decisions that buyers and sellers in fact make under the limited and unlimited liability rules. This analysis enables us to provide a full characterization of the conditions under which each of the rules induces, or fails to induce, efficient behavior, as well as the conditions under which each of the rules is superior to the other.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: contracts, breach, damages, precautions, information, communication

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Date posted: November 21, 2003 ; Last revised: May 5, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Shavell, Steven, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale (1990). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7, pp. 284-312, 1991; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 78. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=471883 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.471883

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3668 (Phone)
617-496-2256 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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