Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=473185
 
 

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Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany


Theodor Baums


J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kenneth E. Scott


Stanford Law School


American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 53, Winter 2005
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 17/2003
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper

Abstract:     
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design - if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors' views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country's legal system, would require.

Keywords: company law (United States, Germany), corporate governance (United States, Germany)

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Keywords: Company Law (United States; Germany); Corporate Governance (United States; Germany)

JEL Classification: G3, K22

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Date posted: November 30, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Baums, Theodor and Scott, Kenneth E., Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the United States and Germany. American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 53, Winter 2005; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 17/2003; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=473185 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.473185

Contact Information

Theodor Baums (Contact Author)
J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main ( email )
Senckenberganlage 31
60325 Frankfurt/M.
Germany
+49 (0) 69 798 22218 (Phone)
+49 (0) 69 798 227474 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Kenneth E. Scott
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-3070 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)
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