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Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jerold L. Zimmerman


University of Rochester - Simon School of Business


Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7 , No. 1-3, pp. 3-9, 1985

Abstract:     
The papers in this volume and briefly summarized in this introduction document that: (1) executive compensation is positively related to share price performance: (2) poor firm performance is associated with increased executive turnover; (3) managers choose accounting accruals in ways, that increase the value of their bonus awards; (4) the adoption of new short- and long-term executive compensation plans and golden parachutes are associated with positive share price reactions; (5) the death of a firm's founder is associated with positive share price reactions; and (b) managers are less likely to make merger bids that lower their stock prices when they hold more stock in their firm. These findings are interpreted as generally supporting the view that executive compensation packages help align managers' and shareholders' interests.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: executive compensation, performance, golden parachutes, share price reaction, manager and shareholder interest

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Date posted: December 11, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C. and Zimmerman, Jerold L., Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7 , No. 1-3, pp. 3-9, 1985 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=476422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.476422

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
7858 Sanderling Road
Sarasota, FL 34242
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Jerold L. Zimmerman
University of Rochester - Simon School of Business ( email )
Rochester, NY 14627
United States
585-275-3397 (Phone)
585-442-6323 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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