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Comment on Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients


Abraham L. Wickelgren


University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics
August 2003


Abstract:     
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) propose a novel system for eliminating the conflict of interest between lawyers and clients over how hard the lawyer should work on a given case. In their analysis of the system, however, Polinsky and Rubinfeld implicitly assume that the lawyer's marginal cost of effort is common knowledge. This comment shows that, when that assumption is relaxed, while their scheme does reduce the agency problem relative to the standard contingency fee arrangement, it no longer eliminates it.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: attorney-client, agency, contingent fees

JEL Classification: K10, K41

working papers series


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Date posted: December 18, 2003  

Suggested Citation

Wickelgren, Abraham L., Comment on Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients (August 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=478062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.478062

Contact Information

Abraham L. Wickelgren (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics
Austin, TX 78712
United States
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