Comment on Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
Abraham L. Wickelgren
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law; University of Texas at Austin - Center for Law, Business, and Economics
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) propose a novel system for eliminating the conflict of interest between lawyers and clients over how hard the lawyer should work on a given case. In their analysis of the system, however, Polinsky and Rubinfeld implicitly assume that the lawyer's marginal cost of effort is common knowledge. This comment shows that, when that assumption is relaxed, while their scheme does reduce the agency problem relative to the standard contingency fee arrangement, it no longer eliminates it.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: attorney-client, agency, contingent fees
JEL Classification: K10, K41working papers series
Date posted: December 18, 2003
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