The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy
Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 12, pp. 911-949, 1987
This paper provides a compact account of the problem of distorted choice in corporate takeovers. (A more detailed account is provided in, "Towards Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers"). I analyze how the tender decisions of shareholders facing a takeover bid might be distorted. I also put forward an approach for addressing this problem, as well as analyze several alternative remedies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41
Keywords: Takeovers, targets, pressure, tender offers, for tender anti-takeover arrangements, anti-takeover statues, minority shares, freeze outs, bid price, voting
JEL Classification: G30, G34, K22Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: December 27, 2003
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