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The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies


Daniel Diermeier


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Hulya Eraslan


Johns Hopkins University

Antonio Merlo


University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
December 2003

PIER Working Paper No. 03-037

Abstract:     
In this article we present an overview of our recent research on the effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies. Our approach is based on the solution and estimation of a multilateral bargaining model which we use to investigate the consequences of constitutional features of parliamentary democracy for the formation and stability of coalition governments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: Political Stability, Coalition Governments, Constitutional Design

JEL Classification: D72, H19, C73

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Date posted: January 8, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel, Eraslan, Hulya and Merlo, Antonio M., The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies (December 2003). PIER Working Paper No. 03-037. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=484363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.484363

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Hulya Eraslan
Johns Hopkins University ( email )
3400 Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218-2685
United States
Antonio M. Merlo
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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