Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=485022
 
 

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Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price


Adam C. Pritchard


University of Michigan Law School


Berkeley Business Law Journal, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently cleared a path for controlling shareholders to freeze out minority shareholders through a combination of a tender offer and a short-form merger. This article defends that doctrinal development against recent attacks from a number of commentators. I conclude that the risks of coercion are slight in this context and that minority shareholders are unlikely to benefit from more intrusive judicial scrutiny.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: January 7, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Pritchard, Adam C., Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price. Berkeley Business Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=485022

Contact Information

Adam C. Pritchard (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4048 (Phone)
734-647-7349 (Fax)

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