Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=48688
 
 

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Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries


John Morgan


University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

1997

Princeton University Wilson School WP #183

Abstract:     
When viewed as taxes, lotteries are routinely criticized as being both inequitable and inefficient. But is this an entirely fair comparison? Frequently lotteries are used in lieu of voluntary contributions by private charities and governments when taxes are not feasible. In this paper, a model of equilibrium wagering behavior in lotteries, whose proceeds will be used to fund a public good, is considered. Relative to voluntary contributions, wagers in the unique lottery equilibrium (a) increase the provision of the public good, (b) are welfare improving, and (c) provide levels of the public good close to first-best as the lottery prize increases.

JEL Classification: D44, H41

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: January 13, 1998  

Suggested Citation

Morgan, John, Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries (1997). Princeton University Wilson School WP #183. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=48688

Contact Information

John Morgan (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/
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