How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?
Steven N. Kaplan
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
UBS Global Asset Management; University of Lausanne IMD
Swedish House of Finance
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4161
We analyse venture capital (VC) investments in 23 non-US countries and compare them to VC investments in the US. We describe how the contracts allocate cash flow, board, liquidation, and other control rights. In univariate analyses, contracts differ across legal regimes. At the same time, however, more experienced VCs implement US-style contracts regardless of legal regime. In most specifications, legal regime becomes insignificant controlling for VC sophistication. VCs who use US-style contracts fail significantly less often. Financial contracting theories in the presence of fixed costs of learning, therefore, appear to explain contracts along a wide range of legal regimes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 40
JEL Classification: G24, G32working papers series
Date posted: January 12, 2004
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