Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=487262
 
 

References (5)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Separating Signaling Equilibria under Random Relations Between Costs and Attributes: Continuum of Attributes


David Feldman


University of New South Wales - Banking & Finance, Australian School of Business; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Russell S. Winer


New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing

December 12, 2004


Abstract:     
We identify conditions for separating signaling equilibria where costs and attributes are randomly related and where both take a continuum of values. A necessary and sufficient condition is the ordering by the cost elasticities of the cost density functions with respect to the original probability measure and with respect to a probability measure modified by the attribute payoff function. This condition is the equivalent, under the continuum of attributes, to the condition, under discrete attributes, of ordering by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) that Feldman (2003) found in a companion paper. We, thus, introduce the concept of Generalized MLRP (GMLRP). While the original MLRP ranks only posterior distributions induced by particular realizations, the GMLRP ranks posterior distributions induced by distributions as well.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Equilibrium, Signaling, Asymmetric Information, Monotone Likelihood Ratio

JEL Classification: D82

working papers series


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Date posted: January 20, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Feldman, David and Winer, Russell S., Separating Signaling Equilibria under Random Relations Between Costs and Attributes: Continuum of Attributes (December 12, 2004). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=487262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.487262

Contact Information

David Feldman (Contact Author)
University of New South Wales - Banking & Finance, Australian School of Business ( email )
UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61 2 9385 5748 (Phone)
+61 2 9385 6347 (Fax)
Financial Research Network (FIRN)
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Russell S. Winer
New York University (NYU) - Department of Marketing ( email )
Henry Kaufman Ctr
44 W 4 St.
New York, NY
United States
212-998-0540 (Phone)
212-995-4006 (Fax)
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