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Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany


Laszlo Goerke


University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Markus Pannenberg


University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld - Department of Business and Economics; DIW Berlin - GSOEP; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn

December 2003

IZA Discussion Paper No. 962

Abstract:     
In the absence of closed-shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms. We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict freeriding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free-rider problem.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: Germany, norms, social custom, trade union membership

JEL Classification: D71, J51

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Date posted: January 19, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Goerke, Laszlo and Pannenberg, Markus, Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany (December 2003). IZA Discussion Paper No. 962. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=487263

Contact Information

Laszlo Goerke (Contact Author)
University of Trier - Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Community ( email )
Campus II
Trier, 54286
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.iaaeu.de/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Markus Pannenberg
University of Applied Sciences Bielefeld - Department of Business and Economics ( email )
Universitätsstrasse 25
Bielefeld, D-33615
Germany
+49 521 106-5076 (Phone)
+49 521 106-5086 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://aix5.fh-bielefeld.de/~mpannenb/index.html
DIW Berlin - GSOEP ( email )
Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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