Abstract

 
 

References (7)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits Too Small?


Willem H. Buiter


Citigroup; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - Office of the Chief Economist; University of Cambridge - Trinity College; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Anne Sibert


Birkbeck, University of London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 2004

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4164

Abstract:     
In a dynamic optimizing model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

JEL Classification: E62, F42, H21

working papers series


Date posted: January 14, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Buiter, Willem H. and Sibert, Anne, Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits Too Small? (January 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4164. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=487524

Contact Information

Willem H. Buiter (Contact Author)
Citigroup ( email )
Citigroup Centre
Canada Square, Canary Wharf
London, E14 5LB
United Kingdom
+ (0)207986 5944 (Phone)
+ (0) 20 7986 3221 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://willembuiter.com/
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - Office of the Chief Economist ( email )
One Exchange Square
London EC2A 2JN
United Kingdom
+44 20 7338 6805 (Phone)
+44 20 7338 6111 (Fax)
University of Cambridge - Trinity College ( email )
Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom
+44 1223 335210 (Phone)
+44 1223 335475 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Anne Sibert
Birkbeck, University of London ( email )
Malet Street
London, WC1E 7HX
United Kingdom
+44 20 7631 6420 (Phone)
+44 20 7631 6416 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ems.bbk.ac.uk/faculty/sibert/index_html
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 448
Downloads: 14
References:  7
Citations:  2

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.984 seconds