The Detention Power
Stephen I. Vladeck
American University - Washington College of Law
Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 22, No. 155, 2004
This paper surveys the history of the executive detention power in American law, from the Founding through the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.
Focusing on precedents from the Civil War, World War II, and the so-called Emergency Detention Era, the paper concludes that courts have never deferred to the concept of an inherent executive detention authority, and that, especially after the 1971 enactment of 18 U.S.C. 4001(a), the power to authorize the extra-judicial detention of U.S. citizens is emphatically the province of Congress, and Congress alone.
The paper concludes with an analysis of the application of the detention power in the post-9/11 context, focusing on the detentions of Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla. The paper concludes that neither of the statutes invoked by the government in Hamdi and Padilla, the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan, or 10 U.S.C. 956(5), satisfies the requirements of 4001, and thus the detentions of both citizens raise serious constitutional questions.
Keywords: War, terrorism, detention, separation of powers, emergency, Hamdi, PadillaAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: January 21, 2004
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