Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=489695
 
 

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Entry, Pricing, and Product Design in an Initially Monopolized Market


Steven J. Davis


University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kevin M. Murphy


University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert H. Topel


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)


Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. S188-S225, February 2004

Abstract:     
We analyze entry, pricing, and product design in a model with differentiated products. Market equilibrium can be "separating," with multiple sellers and a sorting of heterogeneous consumers across goods, or "exclusionary," with one seller serving all customer types. Entry into an initially monopolized market can occur because of cost reductions or product improvements, but entry need not lower the incumbent's price, improve efficiency, or raise consumer welfare. Postentry design incentives favor a softening of price competition and stronger market segmentation, whereas exclusionary design changes typically raise consumer welfare. Potential, as distinct from actual, entry always benefits consumers.

Accepted Paper Series





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Date posted: January 26, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Davis, Steven J. and Murphy, Kevin M. and Topel, Robert H., Entry, Pricing, and Product Design in an Initially Monopolized Market. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. 1, pp. S188-S225, February 2004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=489695

Contact Information

Steven J. Davis (Contact Author)
University of Chicago ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7312 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Kevin M. Murphy
University of Chicago ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7280 (Phone)
773-702-2699 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Robert H. Topel
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7524 (Phone)
773-702-2699 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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