Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=489722
 
 

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The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform


Damien Geradin


George Mason University School of Law; Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Covington & Burling LLP

Nicolas Petit


University of Liege



Abstract:     
In this paper we analyse institutional issues of common interest to the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and the European Agencies (EAs) created under the impulsion of EC law. Both sets of bodies are examined through the lenses of three institutional regulatory parameters, i.e. (i) the jurisdictional level at which agencies should be placed (EU vs. national), (ii) the degree of homogeneity/heterogeneity that is desirable among agencies, and (iii) the state of compliance with principles of good governance. On the basis of this analysis, we argue that there is some scope for significant reforms. While the creation of NRAs and EAs can be seen as a positive development of EC law, the methods of functioning of these agencies and the way they are organised could largely be improved, in particular with regards to principles of good governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

Keywords: Agencies, regulation, European Union, governance, accountability

JEL Classification: L50

working papers series


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Date posted: January 26, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Geradin, Damien and Petit, Nicolas, The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=489722 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.489722

Contact Information

Damien Geradin (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason Law School Logo

Tilburg University - Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/
Covington & Burling LLP ( email )
1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004-2401
United States
Nicolas Petit
University of Liege ( email )
B-4000 Liege
Belgium
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