Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Randall S. Kroszner
Booth School of Business, University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Douglas A. Irwin
Dartmouth College - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
NBER Working Paper No. w5510
We analyze Senate roll-call votes concerning tariffs on specific goods in order to understand the economic and political factors influencing the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. Contrary to recent studies emphasizing the partisan nature of the Congressional votes, our reading of the debates in the Congressional Record suggests that the final, party-line voting masks a rich vote- trading dynamic. We estimate a logit model of specific tariff votes that permits us to identify (a) important influences of specific producer beneficiaries in each Senator's constituency and (b) log- rolling coalitions among Senators with otherwise unrelated constituency interests which succeeded in raising tariff rates.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36working papers series
Date posted: December 20, 1998
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.469 seconds