Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=492361
 
 

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Persuasion in Politics


Kevin M. Murphy


University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

January 2004

NBER Working Paper No. w10248

Abstract:     
We present a model of the creation of social networks, such as political parties, trade unions, religious coalitions, or political action committees, through discussion and mutual persuasion among their members. The key idea is that people are influenced by those inside their network, but not by those outside. Once created, networks can be rented out' to politicians who seek votes and support for their initiatives and ideas, which may have little to do with network members' core beliefs. In this framework, political competition does not lead to convergence of party platforms to the views of the median voter. Rather, parties separate their messages and try to isolate their members to prevent personal influence from those in the opposition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

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Date posted: January 31, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Kevin M. and Shleifer, Andrei, Persuasion in Politics (January 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10248. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=492361

Contact Information

Kevin M. Murphy (Contact Author)
University of Chicago ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7280 (Phone)
773-702-2699 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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