Abstract

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The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England


Daniel M. Klerman


USC Gould School of Law

Paul G. Mahoney


University of Virginia School of Law

January 2004

Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-12; USC Law and Public Policy Research Paper No. 04-2; USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No. 04-2

Abstract:     
This paper assesses the impact of judicial independence on equity markets. North and Weingast (1989) argue that judicial independence and other institutional changes inaugurated by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 allowed the English government credibly to commit to repay sovereign debt and more generally to protect contractual and property rights. Although they provide some supporting empirical evidence, they do not investigate the effect of judicial independence separately from that of other institutional innovations. This paper is the first to attempt to do so. We look at share price movements at critical points in the passage of the 1701 Act of Settlement and other events which gave judges greater security of tenure and higher salaries. Our results suggest that giving judges tenure during good behavior had a large and statistically significant positive impact on share prices, while salary increases and other improvements to judicial independence had impacts which were consistently positive, but not individually statistically significant.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Judicial independence, Glorious Revolution, law and finance

JEL Classification: H11, K40, N43

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Date posted: February 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M. and Mahoney, Paul G., The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th Century England (January 2004). Univ. of Virginia Law & Econ Research Paper No. 03-12; USC Law and Public Policy Research Paper No. 04-2; USC Law School, Olin Research Paper No. 04-2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=495642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.495642

Contact Information

Daniel M. Klerman
USC Gould School of Law ( email )
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.klerman.com

Paul G. Mahoney (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7343 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

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