Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans?

Abstract:     
Using data on over 6000 loans issued to US firms between 1990 and 2004, we find that lower takeover defenses (as proxied by lower G-index of Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)) significantly increase the cost of bank loans for a firm. Firms with lowest takeover defense (democracy) pay 25% higher spread on their bank loans as compared to firms with the highest takeover defense (dictatorship), after controlling for various firm and loan characteristics. Further investigations indicate that banks charge higher loan spread to firms with higher takeover vulnerability mainly because of their concern about a substantial increase in financial risk after the takeover. Our results have important implications for understanding the link between a firm's governance structure and its cost of capital. Our study suggests that firms that rely too much on corporate control market as a governance device are punished by costlier bank loans.

Keywords: Corporate governance, shareholder rights, investor protection, hostile takeovers, bank loans, loan spreads

JEL Classifications: D23, G21, G32, K42

Working Paper Series