Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=496563
 
 

References (30)



 
 

Citations (32)



 


 



Competition and Co-operation Among Exchanges: A Theory of Cross Listing and Endogenous Listing Standards


Thomas J. Chemmanur


Boston College - Carroll School of Management

Paolo Fulghieri


University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 25, 2003


Abstract:     
We analyze firms' choice between exchanges to list their equity (including multiple listings), and exchanges' choice of listing standards for firms which apply for listing, in an environment of competition and co-operation among exchanges. We model an equity market characterized by asymmetric information, where outsiders can reduce their informational disadvantage relative to insiders by producing (noisy) information about firms at a cost. Exchanges are populated by two kinds of investors: sophisticated investors, with a cost advantage in producing information (low-cost investors), and ordinary investors, without such a cost-advantage (high-cost investors); the proportions of these two kinds of investors vary across exchanges. While firms are short-lived agents, exchanges are long-lived, value-maximizing agents, whose stringency in their listing and disclosure standards evolve over time. Exchanges also use their listing standards as a tool in competing with other exchanges for listings by firms. However, outsiders can partially infer the rigor of an exchange's listing policy by studying the subsequent performance of firms which have obtained listing there. The listing standards chosen by an exchange therefore affects its reputation. The listing choices of firms between exchanges, the valuation effects of listings on firm equity, and exchanges' listing standards emerge endogenously in equilibrium. Our model has implications for: the relationship between firm characteristics and the benefits from cross (and dual) listing; the price effects of cross listings; the relationship between cross listing and financial analyst following; the relationship between an exchange's reputation and its listing standards; the impact of competition on an exchange's listing standard; the impact of an alliance between exchanges on the listing standards of the allied exchange and of exchanges competing with it; and for the optimal regulation of exchanges.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

JEL Classification: F30, G30

working papers series


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Date posted: February 7, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Chemmanur, Thomas J. and Fulghieri, Paolo, Competition and Co-operation Among Exchanges: A Theory of Cross Listing and Endogenous Listing Standards (August 25, 2003). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=496563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.496563

Contact Information

Thomas J. Chemmanur (Contact Author)
Boston College - Carroll School of Management ( email )
440 Fulton Hall
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
617-552-3980 (Phone)
617-552-0431 (Fax)
Paolo Fulghieri
University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )
Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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References:  30
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