Experiments on Unemployment Benefit Sanctions and Job Search Behavior
Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); TILEC
University of Magdeburg
Jan C. Van Ours
Tilburg University - Department of Economics; University of Melbourne - Department of Economics
IZA Discussion Paper No. 1000
This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction imposed (the ex ante effect). We find that both effects matter. Moreover, the ex ante effect turns out to be substantial and bigger than the ex post effect. Benefit sanctions stimulate the outflow from unemployment.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31
Keywords: experiments, unemployment benefits, sanctions, job search
JEL Classification: C91, J64, J65working papers series
Date posted: February 10, 2004
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