Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=500913
 
 

References (21)



 
 

Citations (9)



 


 



Codes in Organizations


Jacques Cremer


Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI & GREMAQ)

Luis Garicano


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Andrea Prat


London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

January 2004

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4205

Abstract:     
A code is a technical language that members of an organization learn in order to communicate among themselves and with members of other organizations. What are the features of an optimal code and how does it interact with the characteristics of the organization? This Paper develops a simple communication model and characterizes optimal codes. There exists a fundamental trade-off between choosing a specialized code that simplifies internal communication and a common code that facilitates external communication. We identify the drivers of this trade-off and we study the strategic aspects of code adoption. The results are used to interpret some existing organizational structures.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Coding, organization theory, communication cost

JEL Classification: D23

working papers series





Date posted: February 9, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Cremer, Jacques and Garicano, Luis and Prat, Andrea, Codes in Organizations (January 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4205. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=500913

Contact Information

Jacques Cremer
Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI & GREMAQ) ( email )
Toulouse School of Economics
21 Allee de Brienne
Toulouse Cedex 6, F-31015
France
+33 620116695 (Phone)
+33 5 6112 8637 (Fax)
Luis Garicano (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics ( email )
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2862 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Andrea Prat
London School of Economics (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6992 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6951 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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