Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom

32 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2004

See all articles by David Pozen

David Pozen

Columbia University - Law School

Abstract

This paper traces the recent history and development of privately operated prisons in the United States and the United Kingdom, and it compares their current role in the countries' correctional systems. The privatization movements of the U.S. and the U.K. were driven by similar factors, but the relative weight of these factors varied between the two. In the U.S., legal pressures to alleviate prison overcrowding and fiscal incentives to contract out prison construction were stronger, while in the U.K. the ideological and political aims of the governing party exerted more influence in stimulating privatization. America's experience with private prisons in the 1980s set an important precedent for Britain, but the U.K. ultimately adopted a different model of privatization. Although results are not conclusive to date, it appears the British model of regulating private prisons - with highly prescriptive contracts, multiple levels of monitoring, and output-based evaluations - has yielded superior performance from the private sector. Better designed regulatory frameworks would allow both countries to realize more of the potential benefits of private prisons while minimizing the possibilities for abuse.

Keywords: Correctional regulation, prison privatization, provision of public goods

JEL Classification: H0, H1, H4, K0, K4

Suggested Citation

Pozen, David E., Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=502962

David E. Pozen (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/david-pozen

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