Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=502982
 
 

Citations (32)



 
 

Footnotes (38)



 


 



Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks


Robert S. Pindyck


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

February 2004

NBER Working Paper No. w10287

Abstract:     
This paper addresses the impact on investment incentives of the network sharing arrangements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, with a focus on the implications of irreversible investment. Although the goal is to promote competition, the sharing rules now in place reduce incentives to build new networks or upgrade existing ones. Such investments are irreversible -- they involve sunk costs. The basic framework adopted by regulators allows entrants to utilize such facilities at prices reflecting what it would cost a new, efficient, large-scale network to be built. Such sharing opportunities are extensive, covering virtually the entire suite of network services provided, and extremely flexible, as the entrant can rent facilities in small increments for short duration, with no long-term contracts required. Because the entrant does not bear the sunk costs, this leads to an asymmetric allocation of risk and return that is not properly accounted for in the pricing of network services, which creates a significant investment disincentive.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 13, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Pindyck, Robert S., Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom Networks (February 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10287. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=502982

Contact Information

Robert S. Pindyck (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
50 Memorial Drive, E52-450
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-6641 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,051
Downloads: 68
Download Rank: 27,006
Citations:  32
Footnotes:  38

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.781 seconds