Abstract

 
 

Footnotes (4)



 


 



Federalism and Regulation: An Overview


Robert W. Hahn


University of Oxford, Smith School; Georgetown University

Anne Layne-Farrar


Charles River Associates

Peter Passell


Milken Institute


Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 46-50, Winter 2003-2004
AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 03-14

Abstract:     
This paper examines arguments for and against the centralization of regulation,using the wireless communications industry as a case study. Several factors suggest that the burden increasingly ought to fall on proponents of decentralization. Scale, scope and network efficiencies are growing in many markets, raising the potential costs of balkanization. And rapid technological change strains the expertise of under-funded, under-skilled local regulators. At the same time, one must be careful not to assume that skilled regulators will necessarily do the right thing. The political context in which regulators operate is often decisive.
With wireless we expect that more efficient outcomes are far more likely with federal than state regulation. We do not believe, however, there is a simple way to generalize about the level of government best suited to regulating from an economic efficiency standpoint. The most that theory can offer here is a disciplined way of thinking about the issue.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Federalism, regulation, free market, Commerce Clause, economic efficiency, market failures, decentralization, market incentives, social cost

JEL Classification: L5, D7, D73, D78, H1, H4

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 24, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Robert W., Layne-Farrar, Anne and Passell, Peter, Federalism and Regulation: An Overview. Regulation, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 46-50, Winter 2003-2004; AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 03-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=506062

Contact Information

Robert W. Hahn (Contact Author)
University of Oxford, Smith School ( email )
Oxford
United Kingdom
Georgetown University
Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Anne Layne-Farrar
Charles River Associates ( email )
1 South Wacker Drive
Suite 3400
Chicago, IL 60606
United States
312-377-9238 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.crai.com
Peter Passell
Milken Institute ( email )
1250 Fourth Street
Santa Monica, CA 90401
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,115
Downloads: 177
Download Rank: 84,164
Footnotes:  4

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.578 seconds